The same dealer-market inefficiency that rewards patient buyers of dislocated municipal bonds is present — and independently harvestable — in individual corporate bonds. Buying a bond when it prints several points below its own recent level (a forced-seller dislocation) and holding to reversion earns a statistically significant excess return over random entry in the same bonds, across a full 22-year sample that spans the 2008 GFC and the 2020 COVID shock.
A repeatable source of +2.1% per-trade excess over a matched control (p<0.001) in a $10-trillion market, validated on the full survivorship-complete universe (every bond, defaulters included), with parameters transferred verbatim from the muni strategy — zero corporate-specific fitting. Attempts to "improve" it with regime/credit overlays were rejected for failing out-of-sample.
US corporates are a ~$10-trillion, over-the-counter dealer market of hundreds of thousands of CUSIPs. Like munis — but with wider spreads and richer credit dispersion — most bonds trade intermittently and customers cross a bid–ask spread on every trade. Every transaction is reported to FINRA (TRACE). Short-horizon timing loses to the spread; a patient buyer of idiosyncratic dislocations is paid a reversion premium for absorbing forced selling (fund redemptions, downgrades, tax-loss and index-exclusion selling).
Source: Open Source Bond Asset Pricing (Dickerson et al.) — a free, processed daily corporate-bond panel built from TRACE, with clean price, bid, ask, yield and credit spread. The bid/ask lets us model execution faithfully (buy at the ask, sell at the bid).
The panel is the full TRACE tape, including bonds that default, get called or go quiet. 70% of bonds stop trading before the sample end and are retained with their final prices; 8% ever crash below 50; and 7–14% of strategy positions exit "stale" — the bond stopped trading mid-hold — taking the realized loss. The edge is measured after those losses.
Enter when a bond's ask prints ≥3 points below its trailing 60-day median clean price and it clears the liquidity gate. Fill at the ask. Exit at the bid after a ~1-year hold. The rule is the muni KEYSTONE specification applied unchanged — a deliberate out-of-sample transfer test across asset classes.
| Entry threshold | Trades | Win | Mean/trade | Excess | p |
|---|
| Window | Trades | Win | Mean/trade | Excess vs ctrl | p |
|---|
| Era | Trades | Win | Mean/trade | Excess | p |
|---|
Equal-weight portfolio of open positions (≥3-point operating point) vs LQD total return over the same window.
| Total | CAGR | Max drawdown* |
|---|
The full-universe book carries ~3,100 concurrent positions — more than a real desk would run. Can a much smaller, higher-conviction book keep, or beat, the edge? We tested point-in-time filters on credit quality (entry-day credit spread) and duration (years to maturity), each baked into the eligibility gate so the matched control trades the same selected subset. The answer is decisive — and it overturns the intuitive guess that "trade only the safest bonds."
| Entry credit spread | OOS trades | Win | Mean/trade | Excess |
|---|
Top-IG dislocations have no out-of-sample timing edge and even lost money outright (the 2022 rate selloff crushed long high-grade). The reversion alpha lives in crossover/HY names; only the very deepest distress (spread >5%) is worth trimming, and only as a tail-risk knob.
| Years to maturity | OOS trades | Win | Mean/trade | Excess |
|---|
Short-dated (≤5y) dislocations must pull to par, so they revert — OOS excess +3.5%, double the full book, on ~30% of the trades. Long bonds (>12y) show zero OOS edge: their price is driven by rates, not idiosyncratic reversion.
Short-dated selection is not an overfit overlay: it is monotone across the maturity spectrum, economically structural (pull-to-par), improves both IS and OOS, and — unlike the rejected regime gate in §9 — repairs the 2008 GFC out-of-sample rather than curve-fitting it. Fewer names, higher conviction, and the base book's one weak regime is gone.
| Book | Avg pos. | Total | CAGR | MaxDD* | OOS excess |
|---|
| Era (≤5y book) | Trades | Win | Excess | p |
|---|
*Drawdown understated by linear intra-trade attribution — honest daily-mark figures in §8.5; total & CAGR realized from bid/ask fills.
A second research program — six agent "trading lenses" proposing 24 specs, 13 strategy families screened in-sample with pre-registered kill gates, survivors given exactly one out-of-sample look — searched for a higher-Sharpe construction and stress-tested this strategy's accounting. Three results matter:
The equity-curve drawdowns above use linear intra-trade attribution, which smooths the path. Re-marking every position daily at its actual mid prints (stale marks flat, monthly Sharpe vs T-bill):
| book | chart maxDD | honest maxDD | Sharpe |
|---|---|---|---|
| full ≥3pt | −14.1% | −32.7% | 0.41 |
| focused ≤5y | −15.4% | −31.3% | 0.46 |
| ≤5y + issuer cap | — | −30.0% | 0.58 |
Total return and CAGR are unaffected — they were always realized from bid/ask fills. Real risk is ~2× the smoothed path; risk-adjusted return is ordinary, not exceptional.
On the issuer-capped ≤5y book, accept the fill only if the ask ≤ latest prior mid + 0.25 — never chase a bounced price (the control faces the same fill cap). One frozen parameter; the cap is an implicit depth filter, and depth was monotone from the first sweep.
| window | n | mean/tr | excess | CAGR | Sharpe |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IS 2003–15 | 2,018 | +12.62% | +4.56% | +11.45% | 0.99 |
| OOS 2016–25 (one-shot) | 2,733 | +10.98% | +5.48% | +8.05% | 0.56 |
| full 2003–25 | 4,592 | +10.54% | +4.58% | +8.88% | 0.73 |
OOS excess above IS — no decay. All p<0.001. The rule also transfers in reverse to munis (excess IS +1.97→+3.36%, OOS +2.99→+3.99%) — four independent validating samples. Diagnostics: cap monotone, excess positive in all 6 eras (incl. GFC +4.66% and 2021–23 +1.37%), strongest in the most liquid quartile.
Same entries, two more frozen rules: size ∝ dislocation depth (capped 0.5–2×) and sell at the first bid ≥21d in once the day's mid recovers to the entry-day median (455d stop). Third one-shot OOS batch, paired on identical entries:
| GRANITE-XL | mean/tr | hold | CAGR | Sharpe | maxDD |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IS 2003–15 | +6.34% | 271d | +19.24% | 1.15 | −41.6% |
| OOS 2016–25 (one-shot) | +6.87% | 266d | +17.13% | 1.03 | −34.3% |
Faster recycling: deep entries revert early, the exit harvests and redeploys — per-trade halves, compounding doubles. (The recovery-exit idea had one prior OOS glimpse in another configuration — disclosed; all rules frozen before the batch.)
2026-08 audit: those rows accrue carry at the
panel's median-yield proxy; re-priced on recovered real coupons the same fills give
IS +17.8%/1.09, OOS +12.6–14.2%/0.84–0.86 (windowing convention), full
+14.7%/0.93. Implementable live-protocol replays land at OOS +11–14% CAGR —
budget those, not the headline. See XL_AUDIT.md.
The search's target — Sharpe ≈3 / CAGR ≥10% — was not met, with the mechanism demonstrated rather than asserted: the bid-ask toll is paid twice per round trip (it killed every short-horizon sleeve, including one that was significant and monotone in-sample yet still died out-of-sample); all surviving sleeves are long the same credit-beta factor (OOS correlations 0.69–0.85, so combination cannot lift Sharpe); vol-targeting trades CAGR for Sharpe without leverage. Clean kills: fire-sale reversal, spread-widening reversion, carry ladders, issuer relative-value, momentum, fallen-angel proxy, new-issue concession, index-exclusion and hold-to-redemption constructions, vol-managed sizing, calendar effects. The refinement path lifted the frontier to Sharpe ~1.0–1.2 at CAGR ~17% OOS (GRANITE-XL) — the CAGR-10 target is met out-of-sample; Sharpe 3 is not, because every position remains long the single credit-beta factor through a −34% crisis drawdown, and tripling Sharpe requires hedging instruments (CDS, futures, repo leverage) this dataset does not contain. Full write-up: corps/NEW_STRATEGY_SEARCH.md.
The checks a credit-quant desk would demand. Full detail in corps/CORP_AUDIT.md.
| Risk | Status | How addressed |
|---|---|---|
| Survivorship | controlled | full TRACE tape; defaulters retained; 7–14% stale-exit losses taken |
| Selection | controlled | all 55,545 bonds, not a top-N cut; removing our earlier cut raised the excess |
| Look-ahead | controlled | lagged median, trailing gate, next-day entry, past-only exits |
| Overfitting (params) | controlled | parameters transferred verbatim from munis — zero corporate fitting |
| Overfitting (signals) | demonstrated | regime/credit overlays rejected for failing OOS (below) |
| Transaction costs | modeled | actual daily bid/ask fills |
Two economically-motivated overlays were tested and rejected: the market-regime gate looked strong in-sample and "fixed" the 2008 GFC but degraded out-of-sample (the textbook overfitting signature); the per-bond credit filter hurt outright. We publish the base.
| Variant | IS excess | OOS excess | Verdict |
|---|
Deeper thresholds concentrate the alpha (fewer, higher-conviction trades); a dynamic recovery-exit cuts average holding ~35% at similar annualized return.
GRANITE — corporate-bond dislocation-reversion. Data: Open Source Bond Asset Pricing (TRACE). Full method, audit, and per-era detail in corps/CORP_FINDINGS.md and corps/CORP_AUDIT.md. Generated from docs/corps_data.json; every figure recomputes from the panel.
For institutional discussion only · not investment advice · simulated past performance is not indicative of future results.